Choosing to lose
Posted July 10th, 2007 by lex
Great White Northerner Damian over at “The Torch” has an interesting analysis on the subject of powerful states imposing militarily imposing their will on weaker states:
Holding all other variables constant, a militarily strong intervening state is 34 percent less likely to achieve moderately coercive objectives and 58 percent less likely to achieve the most coercive objectives than they are to attain brute force political objectives. When the intervening state has a brute force war aim, the predicted probability of success is over 75 percent. The probability that the intervening state will prevail declines to only 20 percent when the major power has an entirely compliance-dependent political objective.
Our recent experiences with respect to regime change in Iraq (relatively easy) and cultural reformation (lots harder) seem to support his analysis.
What you may find interesting is this particular Canadian’s recommendation.
(I)f Sullivan’s research showed us one thing, it’s that in asymmetric conflicts, the real worry isn’t what’s happening on the battlefield: don’t worry, the CF is going to kick their ass. As I’ve said before, the Taliban can’t defeat the Canadian Forces, only the Canadian public can.
No, our most critical objectives in coercive conflicts must be how to diminish the target’s resolve while also bolstering our own. Because in every other area of an asymmetric conflict, from military to economic to governance, we hold all the cards.